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Oregon State University Professor Emeritus
On July 1, 1 954 I went to Oregon State University as an
assistant professor in the Department of Agricultural
Economics.  My assignment w as to teach farm
management and production economics as well as develop
a research program in water resources economics and
policy.  I soon was appo inted by m y depar tment h ead to
be a member of the regional Committee on the Economics
of Water Resources Development.  This committee was
composed of econ omists fro m dep artmen ts of agricultural
economics in land grant institutions in the w estern states.
It was my good fortune to associate on this Committee
with S.V. Ciriacy-Wantrup, M aurice Kelso, Mark Regan,
Roy Huffman, William Folz, and Stephen Smith.
The Comm ittee on the Economics of W ater Resources
Development was m ade pos sible by a fo undatio n grant to
the Western Agricultural Economics Council, which
consisted of agricultura l econom ics departm ent head s in
the western states.  The council created three committees
in addition to  the one c oncern ed with w ater.  The other
committees were concerned with range resou rces, farm
management, and marketing.
The Committee on the Economics of Water Resource
Development did not co nfine its  attention strictly either to
economics or academic issues.  Representatives from
several academic disciplines other than economics
participated – in particular, political science, engineering,
and the law.  Public policy issues pertaining to water were
discussed in depth.  Governmen t agency people were
invited to give papers an d engage in th ese discussions.
Many asked to attend o n a regu lar basis.  Some did so and
commented that the com mittee activ ities were an  excellent
means of profes sional im provem ent.  My  service on  this
committee (approximately seven years) influenced my
entire professional career.   It  helped me identify important
problems which were used to develop my research
program at Oregon State.  As a result of the committee
experience, I came to recognize the need for insights of
disciplines in addition to economics.  The experience
helped me realize there were intellectual challenges
uniquely associated with public service.
A case can be made that engineers and lawyers were the
dominant professional workers concerned with early water
resource development in the west.  Although it may not
have been its intent, Congress gave economics an
important role in water policy w hen it  wrote the following
words into the Flood Contro l Act of 19 36:  “If the b enefits
to whomsoever they may  accrue are in excess of the
estimated  costs . . .  ”  (49  statute  1570,  33  U. S. C.
Sec. 701a (1952)).  Benefit-cost analysis was thereby
given an imp ortant plac e in water p olicy and  it was up to
econo mists to develop the technique.  Great strides were
made in providing a conceptual framework for ben efit-
cost analysis from the end of World War II in 1945 to the
end of the second Eisenhower administration in 1960.
My ex perience  with the Committee on the Economics of
Water Resources Development provided two foca l points
for all of my subsequent professional work on water.  One
was concerned with f inding ways of valuing market and
non-market water uses on a c omparab le basis.  The
motivation for this work was to discover ways to expand
the scope of economic analysis.  The other focal point
involved a conscious effort on my part to be active
throughout my career in some type of public policy work
on resources and the environment at either the state or the
federal level.  At the state lev el, I served as a member of
the Water Resources Bo ard of Oregon and later on
Oregon’s  Environmental Quality Commission.  At the
federal level, there was active involvement with a
significant number of federal government agencies
concerned in one way or another with resources and the
environ ment.
It was during the late 195 0s that I bec ame ac quainted  with
Charles “Chuck” Warren, a fisheries biologist in the
Department of Fisheries and Wildlife at Oregon State.  He
provided me with a wonderful education about many non-
market uses of the water reso urces of Oregon, and
encouraged me to study them from an econo mic
perspective.  He convin ced me, long before it  became
common place in the economics literature, that it was
possible  for peop le to obtain  satisfaction from knowing a
resource existed even th ough th ey were  unable to
experience it directly.  It was Charles Warren who
encouraged me to attemp t to place an  econom ic value on
the salmon-steel head sports fishery of Oregon, and he
also helped me obtain one of the first grants made to an
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econom ist by the W ater Pollution Control Administration,
a predecessor of the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA).  The grant provided for a study of the economics
of water qu ality in Yaq uina Ba y, Oreg on.  The se early
research efforts on th e evalu ation of the economic value
of non-m arket wa ter uses m ade it possib le to attract
several young ec onomist s to the study of water
econom ics, including Herbert Stoevener, William Brown,
Joe Stevens, and Adam Sokoloski.  The estimation of
market values for non-market water u ses has developed
far beyond anything we imagined possible at that time,
and much  of wha t we did th en now  seems n aïve.  Yet it
was exciting to be among the first to make empirical
estimates of market values for resources that were
allocated and used ou tside regular mark ets.  This research
made me aware of the importance of the institutional
context affecting both market and non-market uses, a
neglected subject fundamental to treating market and non-
market uses in a comparable way.
As noted, my motivation for studying the valuation of
market and non-market water uses was to expand the
scope of econom ic analysis.  Benefit-cost ana lysis is a
special case of economic analysis and does not encomp ass
the whole of it, a distinction it is important to maintain.
Benefit-cost  analysis was invented to assist in the
econo mic analysis of water projects and came to be
required of all federal water investment p rojects.  A
positive benefit-cost ratio became a necessary condition
for the funding of such pro jects.  A require ment to
calculate a benefit-cost ratio is now being considered for
environment investm ents and regulations.  The water
experience demonstrated that a few otherwise worthy
projects  failed to qualify because they could not meet the
benefit-cost  test.  Indeed, those familiar with field
conditions in the water area kno w there w ere man y highly
question able projects that passed the benefit-cost test as
calculated by the operating  agencies.  The m ain purpose
of the benefit-cost test was for it to serve as a winnowing
device, but it did not serve that purpos e well.  A bene fit-
cost analysis of a possible investment or regulation
requires numero us economic judgments about a wide
range of factors, and when done com petently, is never a
routine exercise.  T he wate r experien ce sugg ests that a
blanket benefit-co st requirem ent may  not improve the
decision process u nless the ad ministration of such a
requirement is taken very seriously.  If it is taken
seriously, the transac tion costs asso ciated with  its
mandated use may be quite high.
Even though there are many practical problems associated
with a mandato ry benefit-cost test, research which
expands the scope of econ omic an alysis is usefu l.  It is
importa nt, however, to keep the presuppositions
underlying such work in the open.  The prices resulting
from existing m arkets typic ally are the standards by which
non-market goods and services are judged.  Yet market
prices are a function of the institutional and situational
context in which the markets operate.  Particular market
prices may not provide an appropriate standard of
comparison for a wide range of reasons in particular
circum stances.  Th is is comin g to be recognized in some
of the recen t literature on  benefit-co st analysis  which
places an increased emphasi s on disco vering th e econo mic
value of preferences, rather than using market prices for
this purpose (Randall).  So far as I know, the
computational requirements of doing this have not been
investigated.  Computational requirements will be of great
importance if benefit-cost analysis is made mandatory.
Involvement in public policy work at both the state and
federal level has been the second focus stemming from
my service on  the regio nal w ater com mittee.  Th is
involvement has made my research more relevant and my
work in the classroom more  realistic.  I t has also made me
conscious of how hazardous it is in resource economics to
apply  general so lutions to p articular case s.  The co ntext in
which particular p olicy pro blems an d issues arise is
almost  always d ifferent than  what i s assumed when
general issues are analyzed.  Further, research of actual
situations (particular, as contrasted to ge neral situations)
must  deal with conditions that are un ique to  the situation
being analyzed.  A knowledge of the resource economics
literature is exceedingly useful in policy work if applied
skillfully, but m y experience suggests mechanical and
routine applications are to be avoided.  I t is mechanical
and routine ap plications o f the princip al corpus of
resource economics that has resulted in the criticism that
resource econom ics policy re search yie lds highly
predictab le conclusio ns.  It is my experience that when the
institutional and natu ral conditions surrounding conflict
situations are provided for in economic analysis, the
results are seldom predictable.
My public policy work has permitted m e to contrast
serving as an analyst  at the state with that of serving at the
federal level.  A body of literature on this  subject w ould
be useful, but if such literature exists i t has escaped my
attention.  Some differences are obvious and some are
subtle.  For example, states are often more innovative than
the federal  establishment, but this will not be the case
when there are powerful political forces that support the
status quo.  Nevertheless, the more local the situation,
usually  the more circumscribed the options.  Thus, the
analyst at the national level may adopt the maximization
of welfare for the nation as an objective and analyze
problems accordingly.  At the state level, federal
regulations often must be accepted, and the best solution
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may involve how to use a ny rem aining flex ibility
constructively.  The too ls of analys is are usually the same
but the context is very different.  Water economics
textbooks almost always assume a national point of view.
I do not re comm end oth erwise, bu t the analyst at other
than the federal level n eeds to mak e allowances fo r this.
My experience as a member of the Water Resources
Board of Oregon as well as a member of Oregon’s
Commission on Env ironme ntal Qua lity is at varianc e with
some writings concerning the value of public  hearings  in
conflict resolution .  When  controv ersial issues arise  in
resource management, our democratic government
generally  provides all interested parties an opportu nity to
be heard.  I have attended many late night sessions
listening to a parade of witnesses present a range of pro
and con arg umen ts.  An age ncy m ay deleg ate this
respons ibility to a hearing officer who then provides
decisionmakers with a summary  as well as a transcript of
the testimony.  In a democratic society there is political
value in such a practice.  The opportunity to be heard on
any and all m atters that affec t one clearly  is one of the
advantages of living in  a demo cratic society .  Yet the
substantive value of public hearings have been questioned
by many, a nd the attitud e exists with in agenc ies, as well
as in the acad emic pr ofession, th at testimon y from  public
hearings is of little value except as a way of judging
political pressures.  My experience leads me to dissent
vigorously.  I cannot re call a single controversial case on
which I had to mak e a decision , where th e public  hearings
did not result in some important substantive matters being
brought into the open, even though several government
agencies had analyzed the situation and submitted reports.
I have co ncluded  it is very difficult, if not impossible, to
find a ready substitute for grass roots involvement in such
matters.
Are there general conclusions to be drawn from an
experience that has spanned nearly a half century?  If one
had it to do over again, would a career in resource
economics and po licy be the p ath chosen?  What w ere the
principal rewards,  as well as disadvantag es, of the choice
that was made and the accidents that occurred?
I am not certain that natural resource economic s and
policy would be chosen by me again as a major area of
emphasis.   There are many other subjects in which I have
an interest, and  I might c hoose o ne of them .  Nevertheless,
there were characteristics of my work, which  begin w ith
water, that I would  very m uch wa nt to dup licate if I were
to come this way again.  These would include the
oppor tunity  to work with people of great breadth and
depth, such as Sig freid Ciriacy-Wantrup, Charles Warren,
and Gilbert W hite.  It wou ld include  the opportu nity to
engage in, and be nefit from , the insights to  be foun d in the
literature of disciplines other than the one chosen for
major emphasis.   And it w ould inclu de the op portunity  to
spend an entire career with one foot in an intellectual
discipline, and the o ther in the ap plication of that
discipline to practical problem solving.  Provision  would
also need to be made for the excitement that comes from
the making of decisio ns in adm inistration an d in pub lic
policy.  Now that the matter has been pu t in this way, I do
not know w here else I could find an opportunity that
would  provide  all the benefits that have come my way  as
a result of my involvement with wa ter.
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EARLY FEDERAL GUIDELINES 
FOR WATER RESOURCE EVALUATION
Henry P. Caulfield, Jr. 
Emeritus Professor of Political Sciences
Colora do State U niversity
Federal guideline s for wate r resource project evaluation
spring from the Flood Control Act of 1936 wherein the
Congress of the United States (U.S.) directed that flood
control projects sh ould be  undertak en “if the b enefits  to
whomsoever  they m ay accru e are in  excess of the
estimated costs, and if  the lives and social security of
people  are otherwise  adversely  affected.”   The application
of this legislative provision has been far wider than to just
flood control projects.  Either by statute or by
administrative order, the general purport of this provision
has been m ade bro adly app licable to all water resources
projects  of the Corps of Engineers, Bureau of
Reclamation, and the Soil Conservation Service.
The seeming import of this provision was to orient policy
toward economics.  The normative theoretical branch of
the discipline of economics that had been developed up to
then and has b een sub sequen tly further developed, known
as “welfare  econom ics,” became the intellectual
underpinning for this endeavor.  Professor Pigou’s
“Economics of Welfare,” first  published in 1922, was the
takeoff point in this g eneral de velopmen t of econ omic
though t.  The opportunity afforded by the Co ngress to
apply  this normative theory to the field of water and
related land resource use and development was apparen tly
welcomed by econ omists, an d it has bee n substan tially
exploited by them  within the  federal go vernm ent with
outside suppo rt from academ ic econom ists.
The first interdepartmental product of this interest of
econo mists in trying to  implement the statute of 1936 was
popularly  known as the Green B ook, a report of the
Subcommittee on Benefits and Costs  (B/C) of the Federal
Inter-Agency River Basin  Committee (FIARBC).  Bearing
the title “Proposed Practices for Economic Analysis of
River Basin Pr ojects ,” this repor t embo dying P igouvia n
theory was published in 1950 (green was the color of the
cover).  With slight additions and changes, a revised
edition w as publish ed in 19 58. 
The “Proposed Practices . . . ” set forth “criteria and
principles” of “general economic welfare” for “application
by agencies within the framework of their particular
programs and responsibilities.”  Thus goals or objectives
other than “general economic welfare,” defined as
econo mic efficiency fro m a “co mpreh ensive pu blic
viewpo int,” were still recognized as relevant.  For
example, the propos ed practic es were in tended to  apply to
econo mic analysis w ithin the 160-ac re rule in
Reclamation Law to implement the “family farm”
concept.  This rule, it was understood, reflected an
objective other than “general economic welfare” as
defined.
The “Proposed Practices . . . ,” moreover, called for
identification of all bene ficial or adverse effects of a
project in both tangible (i.e., monetary) terms or
intangible  terms.   An “intangible” beneficial effect of a
flood control project, an effect which the Congr ess clearly
had in mind when  it established flood con trol as a
national,  largely no nreimb ursable  project purpose, is the
saving of human life.  However, because of the
subsequent great weight that has been given by the Office
of Management and Budget (formerly the Bureau of the
Budg et) and the Co ngress to a B/C ratio in terms of
tangible values (e.g., saving s in property  damag e) and to
a ratio of 1.0 /1 or greater as the basic criterion of
authorization and funding of a wate r develop ment p roject,
all other goals were made secondary.  For example,
regional development per se (that is provision of
se t t leme n t oppor tun i t i es  o r  improv emen t of
underd evelope d areas, a  major objective  of the Cong ress
in passage of the Reclamation Act of 1902 and the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Act of 1933) was
made second ary to the g oal of natio nal econ omic
efficiency.
The Green Book (1950 or 1958) was never  adopted by the
Federal Inter-Agency River Basin Co mmitte e or its
successor committees, due to continuing interagency
disagreem ents largely over inclusion of “secondary
benefits” in Reclam ation pro ject reports.  However, the
basic philosophy and many of the criteria and principles
of the Green Book, exp licitly or implic itly, were
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embodied in Budget Circular A-47 issued by the U.S.
Bureau of the Budget on  Decem ber 31, 195 2.  Its most
fundamental standards and procedures were these:
1. The most eco nomic al means of meeting needs in a
region were to be set forth as an important
consideration in rev iewing of pro posed projec ts.
2. The relat ive economy of alternative m eans ava ilable
on a national basis for meeting needs was to be set
forth for consideration.
3. Benef its and costs, i n total and separately for each
purpose, were to be set forth.  Where benefits and
costs could n ot be estim ated in mon etary term s, their
relative significanc e was to  be stated in as precise and
quantitative terms as possible; and lastly, in the words
of the circu lar itself:  
4. “Wh ile it is recognized that a comparison of estimated
benefits with estimated costs does not provide a
precise measure of the absolute merits of any
particular program  or projec t, one essential criterion in
justifying any program or p rojects will, ex cept in
unusual cases where ade quate justific ation is
presented, be that its estimated benefits to whomsoever
they m ay accru e exceed  its estimated c osts.”
In contrast to the Green Book, which called for the
application of its criteria and principles within the
framework  of an agency’s particular programs and
respons ibilities, “A-47” called for analyses of proposed
water projects in terms of its standards and procedures by
sponsoring departments and agencies and then an
indication of where a requirement of law or official
agency views were at variance.
The Bureau of the  Budg et attemp ted rigoro usly to app ly
“A-47”  to  all  projects  presented  to   it  for  review   in
the 1950s.  This  effort led to grea t dissatisfaction  with
“A-47” within the Congress beginning about 1956.  Few,
if any, in the Congress called for abandonment of bene fit-
cost analysis per se, but there was a  widespread call for its
“liberalizatio n.”  Demo crats in the Cong ress declared that
the Eisenhower admin istration had  a “no ne w starts
policy.”
“Policies, Standards, and Procedures in the Formulation,
Evaluation and Review of Plans for Use and Development
of Water and  Related Land Resources,” an
interdepartmental agreement appro ved by President
Kennedy for application b y the fede ral departm ents
concerned and the Bureau of the Budget, replaced Budget
Burea u Criteria A -47 on M ay 15, 1 962. 
Published by the Congr ess, the agreement became known
as Senate Document 97.  It was prepared by the
Interdepartmental Staff Committee, ad hoc, U.S. Water
Resources Council.  The author was the chairman.  Key
participan ts were  Eugene Weber and Nathaniel Bach of
the Corps of Engineers, and Harry Steele of the
Department of Agriculture.  Weber and Bach, I believe,
were involved also in preparation of the Green Book.
Bach had transferred to the headquarters of  the Army
Corps of Engineers from the Bureau  of Agriculture
Economics of the Department of Agriculture.
The basic obje ctive in  the formulation  of plans, according
to Senate D ocum ent 97, w as to prov ide the “b est use, o r
combination of uses, of water and related land resources
to meet all foreseeable short or long-term needs.”  In
pursuit  of this basic o bjective, fu ll consideration was to be
given to the following multiple objectives and “reasoned
choices m ade betw een them  when th ey conf lict”: 
1. Development Water and related land resource
development and management was taken to be
essential to economic development and gro wth for all
the various m ultiple purp oses includ ing outd oor
recreation  and fish an d wildlife e nhanc emen t. 
2. Preservation  Proper stewardship of the nation’s
natural bounty was taken to re quire pre servation  in
“particular instances” of open space; gre en space ; wild
areas of rivers, lakes, beaches and mountains; and
areas of unique natural beauty, historical, and
scientific  interest.  (Wild areas of rivers had already
been officially proposed in the interdepartmental
comprehensive study of th e Arkan sas, Red, W hite
River Basin Study, at the urging of Irving Fox
represen ting the D epartm ent of the In terior.)
3. Well-Being of People   Hardship and basic needs of
particular groups was to be of concern, but
development for the benefit of the few or the
disadvantage of the many was to be avo ided.  In
accordance with this objectiv e, socioeco nomic  policy
requirem ents established by the Congress were to be
observed (e.g., the 160-acre rule in relation  to federal
supply  of water for irrigation and “preference clau ses”
relating to the sale of fe deral pow er to pub lic and rural
electric cooper atives).  Als o, “well-being of people”
was an objec tive that cou ld take into  accoun t the
saving of life by a flood control p roject wh ile savings
from p roperty d amag e would  be taken  to be a ben efit
in furtherance of the developmental objective.
16
Comprehensive river basin plans were to be formulated
initially to include all units and purposes which satisfy
national econom ic efficiency  criteria in terms of ta ngible
benefits an d costs: 
1. Tangib le benefits must  exceed project econom ic costs.
2. Each separab le unit or purpose  must provide  benefits
at least equal to its costs.
3. The scope of the development must be such as to
provide the m aximum  net benefits.
4. There is no more economical means, evaluated on a
comp arable  basis, of accomplishing the same pu rpose
or purposes which would be precluded from
develop ment if the  plan we re unde rtaken. 
The discount rate to be used in calculating the present
value of benefits and costs was the weighted average of
the “coupon rates” on outstanding long-term federal
bonds.  In  the 196 0s this abo ut 3 1/4 p ercent.
Thus Senate Document 97 clearly provided that optimum
plans in terms of criteria of national economic efficiency
(assuming one agrees with the provision on the discount
rate) were to be presented for consideration within the
Executive Branch an d to the Con gress.  In addition,
however,  such optimum plans were to provide baselines
from which alternative plans reflecting in tangible  values
reflecting different objectives could be judged, e.g., by
determining the developmental benefits forgone if
preservation of a scenic river is relevant as an alternative
to multiple purpose development.  And , accordin g to
Senate  Documen t 97, when major differences arise among
technically  possible plans conceived as desirable for a
river basin on  the basis of in tangible  benefits and costs,  in
comparison to optimum plans based on tangible b enefits
and costs, alternative plans giving exp ression to these
major differences are to be presented for consideration
within the Exe cutive Branc h and to the C ongress.
Region al, state, and local points of view or objectives
were to be considered as well as national points of v iew in
terms of criteria of national economic efficiency or other
national policy.  A comparison of differences arising from
these various points of view was also to be included in
reports.
Finally, Senate Document 97 provided that general and
specific  judgm ents were  to be made upon comprehensive
plans, programs, and project proposals as a basis for
recommendation to the Congress.  Review aimed at
arriving at such judgements was to be based upon the
provisions of Senate Document 97 itself, applicable laws,
their legislative intent, and executive policies and orders
as well as recognized tech nical standards.  In con trast to
“A-47” no requirement was set forth that projects,
generally, must have a benefit-co st ratio greater  than 1.0
to 1 as a basis for re comm endation  to the Co ngress.  O n
the other hand, Senate Document 97 did not bar the
Bureau of the Budget from adopting such a benefit-cost
ratio requirem ent as its own administrative standard.  And
this requirem ent was th e unwr itten rule since  the
promulgation of Senate Document 97 on May 15, 1962.
Before Presiden t Kenne dy app roved th e agreement
published as Senate Document 97, the Council of
Econo mic Advisors established a three man group of
distinguished academic economists led by Kenneth Arrow
to review the agreement.  Approval was given subject to
a committee to further study of the discount rate.
The Water Resources Council created by the Water
Resources Planning Act of 1965  propos ed in July 196 8 to
amend Senate Document 97 to change the formula for
determination of the discount rate used in the calculation
of benefits and costs.  This precipitated a new
congressional call for “liberalization” supported by
various developmental interest groups.  Raising the
discount rate, which w ould be  the effect o f the form ula
change, would result in a lower B/C ratio and make
infeasible  borderlin e projects th at formerly were
considered feasible.  Af ter extensiv e consu ltation by the
author with key members of the Congress and its staff and
their implicit acceptance, the council adopted and
President Johnson approved, in December 1968, a new
formu la for the annual determination of the discount rate
based upon the “yield rate” on outstanding long-term
federal bonds rather than the “coupon rate.”  This action
initially change d the disco unt rate  then from  3 1/4  percent
to 4 5/8 p ercent. 
After this action (and in view of the obligation of the
Coun cil under Section 103 of the Water Resources
Planning Act of 1965  to promulg ate its own “Principles,
Standards, and  Procedures”  for applica tion by all  federal
water and related land planning agencies and all reviewing
agencies within the executive branch ), the coun cil began
to direct its attention  to this much larger task of replacing
Senate Document 97 in its entirety.
Harry Steele, an Assistant Director of the Water Resource
Coun cil staff, directed this effort.  The basic concept of
multiobjective planning was retained but many changes
were made.  Several revisions of principals and standards
for plans were develop ed.  Ma ny hear ings wer e held  both
in Washington and the field.  Various interest groups, the
Bureau of the Budget, and the Congress expressed very
divergent op inions.
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Early  in the 198 0s, the Re agan ad ministratio n abolished
the active program of th e Wate r Resou rces Co uncil,
including the Fede ral-State  River Basin Commissions that
had been created in the 1960s under the Water Resources
Planning  Act.
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